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 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Active	 ﾠBelief	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠBoyle,	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
proposition,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠact	 ﾠupon	 ﾠhimself;	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
effect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Hampshire,	 ﾠFreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndividual	 ﾠ(1965),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ100	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ABSTRACT:	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠor	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠmust	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
forming	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠones	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
agential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠin	 ﾠholding	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠthus	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠthings	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠact;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠour	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplicate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
I.	 ﾠ Introduction	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
appealed	 ﾠto	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠworking	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinvoked,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
cognition,1	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve,2	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠable,	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠrelying	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐observation	 ﾠor	 ﾠinference.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠ
agree	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠus:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwish	 ﾠwere	 ﾠso	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠO’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠPettit	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠBigrami	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠO’Brien	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠBilgrami	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
so,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠor	 ﾠagency.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠstand	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
another:	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunder	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠa	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agential	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠface:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠother	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠagency	 ﾠor	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ My	 ﾠown	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠessay,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
beliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠquery	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
relate	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠexemplified	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠquotations:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Judgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠdone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠstore	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠmade	 ﾠas	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
stored	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccessed	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious,	 ﾠsubjective	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinker	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstored	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Peacocke	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ88)	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmental	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition…	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ[as	 ﾠtrue]…	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Shah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
503)	 ﾠ
[B]elieving	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ—	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠso	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠ—	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudging,	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Shoemaker	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ36)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠshare	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠitems	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
matters	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontroversy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠterribly	 ﾠcontroversial.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠO’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠBennett	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠ
Hieronymi	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSetiya	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠcategories.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠ“act”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
“activity”)	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠepisode	 ﾠ(presumably,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess).5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Belief,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠepisode.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠconclude,	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
agential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcause	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ“store”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠacts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠget	 ﾠno	 ﾠnearer	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠtouch	 ﾠthem	 ﾠat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠedges,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnear	 ﾠenough	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
dominion	 ﾠover	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠbears	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacteristically	 ﾠagential	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
responsibility.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjust	 ﾠsketched	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠus	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠafter	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠI	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbicycle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbicycle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠgood	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠleft	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠspot,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠassess	 ﾠand	 ﾠact	 ﾠupon,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠstand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintimate	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠme:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdoings	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠ
analogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠact	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠboth	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠand	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
exercises	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlies	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
agential	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelevantly	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagential	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“occurrent”	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesignate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
(phenomenally)	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠmental	 ﾠevents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ“conscious,”	 ﾠhowever:	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
expresses	 ﾠa	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsciousness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠterm	 ﾠseems	 ﾠapt	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠmental	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠongoing,	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠor	 ﾠdiscontinuous,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlasts	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠlength	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠduration	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstopwatch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“occurrent,”	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠitself	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠepisodes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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own	 ﾠactions	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠbelief.6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠsketching	 ﾠsome	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠdo	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ(§II),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
contrast	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠan	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠ(§III).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
thesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
intrinsic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠraise	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠ
conception	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ(§IV),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠa	 ﾠframework	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
(§V).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠ Our	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs:	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“belief”	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhe	 ﾠholds	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠso;	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠ"I	 ﾠdon't	 ﾠknow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhaven't	 ﾠthought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter."	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠmean:	 ﾠ"I	 ﾠmay	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
disbelieve	 ﾠP,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠit."	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠany	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠknows	 ﾠthis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhimself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠconvinces	 ﾠhim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠalways	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠFor	 ﾠother	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠwork	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠactive,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠRödl	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ
3;	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠand	 ﾠunpublished	 ﾠms.;	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ37;	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠforthcoming.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThe	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠ“normally”	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaware,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐deception	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
say	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠme	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠremark	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
possible,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠdrastic	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson's	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠbeliefs:	 ﾠplainly,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgrounds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnotice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠto	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresupposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
believes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠhand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
grounds,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠare	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
reached	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdevelopmental	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“age	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason,”	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
participate	 ﾠin	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠare	 ﾠcredible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonlinguistic	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcognizant	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold;	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthem	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠor	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrounds,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheading	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“privileged	 ﾠaccess”	 ﾠto	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠmental	 ﾠ
states,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠis	 ﾠmisleading	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠleads	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠabout	 ﾠour	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠgive	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠtestimony	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠspecially	 ﾠknowledgeable	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmake	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠavowals	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠtelling	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
criticizing	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠavowal	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠourselves,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgood	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠgood	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠask	 ﾠ
him	 ﾠ“How	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP?”,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠask	 ﾠhim	 ﾠhow	 ﾠhe	 ﾠknows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
blood	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠis	 ﾠelevated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠentertain	 ﾠany	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
person’s	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠour	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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and	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoundness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves,	 ﾠcriticizing	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠhe	 ﾠgives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
beliefs;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠask	 ﾠhim	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠso	 ﾠoutlandish,	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠhe	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanifestly	 ﾠunreasonable	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠis	 ﾠdemonstrably	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠor	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐grounded,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreconsideration,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠhis	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐assessment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
circumstance	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠway.8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Nor	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠstance	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠthis	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠMoran,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
evinced	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠreadiness,	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
“transparent”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠanswering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠand	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠour	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter).	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“theoretical	 ﾠquestion”	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠas	 ﾠamounting,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmy	 ﾠstandpoint,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“deliberative	 ﾠquestion”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscover,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
decide.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠreadiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠas	 ﾠturning	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠsee	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“[a]	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠhomely	 ﾠ
assertion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ[our]	 ﾠfreedom”	 ﾠ(Moran	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ145).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconstantly	 ﾠ
take	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠin	 ﾠundertaking	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠdrew	 ﾠattention	 ﾠabove.9	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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8	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠindication	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccountable:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠhim	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccuracy	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanswer,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠcogency,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠreally	 ﾠjustifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠA	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠis	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
judge	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠByrne	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ84-ﾭ‐5	 ﾠand	 ﾠShah	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Velleman	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ506-ﾭ‐8).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠobserve,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠP	 ﾠtransparently	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠI	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠno	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberation:	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGeithner	 ﾠis	 ﾠSecretary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGeithner	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠSecretary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠever	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠor	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠand	 ﾠagainst.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠ Two	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠas	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.10	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcede	 ﾠthis	 ﾠand	 ﾠstill	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠreally	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
discretion:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“error	 ﾠtheory”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
practice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoubting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠappearances,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠseriously.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠsome	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discretion	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhere:	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠ“up	 ﾠto	 ﾠus”?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠlies	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠjudgments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproposition,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠagainst,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
hold	 ﾠno	 ﾠantecedent	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠforming	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠhold	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control:	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠarise	 ﾠand	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠunreflective	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
believe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“step	 ﾠback”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
someone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠraise	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhimself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsiderations	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
lead	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠour	 ﾠfree	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠstep	 ﾠback,	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠto	 ﾠpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ourselves,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment.11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠoccasions.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“discretion”	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
suggesting	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
anything	 ﾠlike	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
grip	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠFor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ92-ﾭ‐3;	 ﾠand	 ﾠcp.	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠLecture	 ﾠ
1;	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠ§7;	 ﾠO’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ3;	 ﾠand	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠis	 ﾠsound,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠability	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
whereas	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
maintain,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠmy	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠextrinsic:	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠit,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠattributing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠI	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
reading	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠwords	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠare	 ﾠbrief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
am	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠclassifications	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐act,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
intended	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠI	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ“stor[ing]	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠmade”	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ88,	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠadded)	 ﾠand	 ﾠallows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[s]omeone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠdo—in	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstored	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠother	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
action”	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ90,	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠadded).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠlater	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠclassifies	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
“constitutively	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrying,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠbring	 ﾠyourself	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP”	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠhis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaltogether	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsee	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
361).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“when	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠknowledgeable	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
ascriptions	 ﾠ[of	 ﾠbelief]	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreason:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
reached	 ﾠare	 ﾠones	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinker’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbelief”	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ89).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(which,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠPeacocke,	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP)	 ﾠunless	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsure	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ“will,	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcontinuation)	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP”	 ﾠ(Ibid.).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠan	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠworking	 ﾠ
properly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneither	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“continue”	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeans:	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠcontinues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠadvocating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworthwhile	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠlook	 ﾠlike.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠI	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠauthors,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠ
toward	 ﾠclarifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠruling	 ﾠout	 ﾠone	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠtempting	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠand	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠ
another,	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconception	 ﾠinto	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠfocus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠobject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
remarks	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠunambiguously	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
wrong	 ﾠview,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunambiguously	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ At	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠview,	 ﾠone	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
discretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠbut	 ﾠintrinsic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠholding	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠholds	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
someone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
acknowledge	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdeliberates	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠholds	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠmust	 ﾠresist	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠover	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠinitiates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠall	 ﾠalong,	 ﾠin	 ﾠholding	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
holds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠreconsiders	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsome	 ﾠtopic,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠas	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠas	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠengaged,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠaltering	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠup	 ﾠto,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠhe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determinedly	 ﾠholds.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ At	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcharacterizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠslogans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠstill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠand	 ﾠclarification.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠneed,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
all,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠ“intrinsic	 ﾠcontrol”	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠit	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠas	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠor	 ﾠactivity?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠtask	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠclarifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠformidable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠstart	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§V.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
§IV	 ﾠwill	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠmotivate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠby	 ﾠraising	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
view.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠ Against	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview,	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea:	 ﾠ
Ordinarily,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
meant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment…	 ﾠ[i.e.,]	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠmental	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition…	 ﾠ	 ﾠReasoning	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠnot	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ…	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP…	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Shah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ503)	 ﾠ
Perhaps	 ﾠnot	 ﾠevery	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠwake,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠact,	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview.13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠone	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠoddity	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
deliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠI	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠon	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠor	 ﾠfalsity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(normally,	 ﾠanyway)	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman’s	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“aiming	 ﾠat”	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ“meant	 ﾠto”	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠend	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠmisdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
discover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreached	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inscribing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠseems	 ﾠboth	 ﾠovercomplicated	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
excessively	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐involved	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIntuitively,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠmyself.14	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompletion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
project,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ By	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworry	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinducing	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinsist	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnevertheless,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠour	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
functioning	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠits	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpsychology,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠeconomy.15	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtelling	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠ
Does	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠpresupposes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
obtains.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠas	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment:	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefender	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠact	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
judging,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠbelieving,	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill”:	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
P	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠof	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠwrite:	 ﾠ
Exactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠone	 ﾠaccomplishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠ[from	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP]	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠineffable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠaccomplishment,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
occurrently	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠstick	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠlastingly	 ﾠso	 ﾠrepresented.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Shah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ503)	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“ineffable”,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbelieving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠadd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠalso	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
transition:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠmight	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠautomatically,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠor	 ﾠintent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
take	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthink	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠto	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(whatever	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmean)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conviction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressive	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
settled	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠnamely:	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠmean	 ﾠanything	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan:	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressive	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠunless	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconvinces	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠ
sincerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠassent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠbetraying	 ﾠother	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
settled	 ﾠbelief.16	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsincerely	 ﾠassent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠof	 ﾠtravelling	 ﾠby	 ﾠplane	 ﾠthan	 ﾠof	 ﾠtravelling	 ﾠby	 ﾠcar	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠin	 ﾠflight	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠflying	 ﾠ(sweating,	 ﾠ
gripping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmrests,	 ﾠconstantly	 ﾠinquiring	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflight	 ﾠattendants	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠengines	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠotherwise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
sincerely	 ﾠassent	 ﾠto	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐P,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠconclude,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠconcede	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠphenomena,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠP	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ“stick	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠlastingly	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
represented”	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠput	 ﾠit),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠsincerely	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlastingly	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠThus	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠ
Someone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠdo—in	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstored	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Peacocke	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ90)	 ﾠ
Peacocke’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠexample	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠadministrator	 ﾠwho	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠuniversities	 ﾠare	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠas	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwho	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠhiring	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠare	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠqualified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠexample	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
simplicity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠapply	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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what	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmust	 ﾠstick	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
stick	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay:	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpersist	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠoccurrences	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠlast	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited,	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
truth	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“lasting”	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmetaphysical	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠbelong:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠstates.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠqualifies	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠlong	 ﾠit	 ﾠactually	 ﾠlasts,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠstates	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
cut	 ﾠshort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlast	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠflying	 ﾠcase	 ﾠshows,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠwavering	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠof	 ﾠair	 ﾠtravel,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
turns	 ﾠhis	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠand	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠstops.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠuniversally	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdetails.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠview	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠinsincerity	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠ
pathology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠview	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠat	 ﾠone	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐P:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontradiction,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠa	 ﾠquite	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsurrounding.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠphenomena.18	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠright	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanything	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠor	 ﾠsays	 ﾠto	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ“S	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue”	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠascription:	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
describes,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsubmit,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSomeone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
conclusion	 ﾠby	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠlast	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠlength	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime;	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠconsequences,	 ﾠ
etc.),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠad	 ﾠhoc	 ﾠmaneuvers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcome	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“state”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBelow	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠas	 ﾠstates	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠto	 ﾠimply	 ﾠinactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
affect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersist,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠFor	 ﾠone	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠproposal,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠGendler	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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of	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠtouch	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠissue:	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
conceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
produces	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgreeing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠme	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
items	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcategories.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠafter	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
consciousness	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnewly	 ﾠformed	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠare	 ﾠsound,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving.19	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠend	 ﾠor	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
effect,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠto	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠexpressed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwrong.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Thoughts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmade	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠskeptical,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠview,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
judgments	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠGalen	 ﾠStrawson,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance:	 ﾠ
[T]he	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠindirect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠ
prefatory,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcatalytic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠactually	 ﾠhappens,	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠone	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsome	 ﾠissue	 ﾠor	 ﾠwork	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠout?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
issue	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠone,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive,	 ﾠ
phenomenon	 ﾠof	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠone's	 ﾠmind	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem…	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpreparatory,	 ﾠground-ﾭ‐setting,	 ﾠtuning,	 ﾠretuning,	 ﾠshepherding,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
judgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠcare	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠinterpreting	 ﾠ“begin”	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
moment	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠor	 ﾠinitiated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠno	 ﾠsooner	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief’s	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠinitiates	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLoose	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“belief	 ﾠformation”	 ﾠ(“coming	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbelieve”,	 ﾠ“belief-ﾭ‐onset”,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠexacerbates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunclarity.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Note	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠI	 ﾠsay	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠ
“degrees	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsimplicity,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠare:	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ“all	 ﾠout”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdegree,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠposes	 ﾠno	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠview,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conviction	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠalso	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdegree.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠno	 ﾠposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoundness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
gradated	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment;	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠP	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠconviction,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsame	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠconviction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Robert	 ﾠStalnaker	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠme	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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active	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠor	 ﾠintention	 ﾠinitiations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠis	 ﾠwaiting,	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
anything	 ﾠhappens,	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠmind…	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠno	 ﾠaction	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory,	 ﾠcatalytic	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmentioned,	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcontent-ﾭ‐production	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inferential	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcontents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Strawson	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ231-ﾭ‐
3).	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠright	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwrong.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠright	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
observation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠand	 ﾠinferring	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠ
coming	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠI	 ﾠgovern,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠmentions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠStrawson’s	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠprefatory	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
catalytic	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠset	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐forming	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
assumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalways	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof:	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠits	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠshares	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
view.	 ﾠ	 ﾠExtrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠtheorists,	 ﾠimpressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindications	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠ
mature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
assuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠmyself,	 ﾠare	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Strawson	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠskeptics	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠimpressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠ(except	 ﾠby	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠmeans),	 ﾠand	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
exercising	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself,	 ﾠare	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠany	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs.20	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠrespecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠparty:	 ﾠeach	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠright	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
something.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠan	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeach	 ﾠside,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
suggest,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderlies	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdispute:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠOther	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠOwens	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠand	 ﾠSetiya	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
O’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠ(Vol.	 ﾠII,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ543-ﾭ‐5)	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠhe	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“freedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief”	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠO’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ141,	 ﾠ159-ﾭ‐62	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ
Vol.	 ﾠII,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ544).	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠRyle	 ﾠ1949,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ285ff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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discretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐productive	 ﾠdiscretion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠbelieving.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Before	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtask,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠme	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠ
motivation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
wanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠStrawson’s	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠsave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠonly	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠour	 ﾠmind	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
problem,	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠour	 ﾠattention	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfacts,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inferences,	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠor	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠof	 ﾠconclusions,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“mental	 ﾠ
ballistics,”	 ﾠas	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠregard	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠperform,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠregard	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠholds	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
unsound	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠknown	 ﾠbetter,	 ﾠas	 ﾠguilty	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠnegligence	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠof	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠdeliver	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
patently	 ﾠunsound	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠblame	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠblame	 ﾠhim	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
indirect	 ﾠway,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠto	 ﾠcultivate	 ﾠgood	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠin	 ﾠhimself,	 ﾠor	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠunderway.21	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdone	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcould,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworked	 ﾠout,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠjust	 ﾠregard	 ﾠhim	 ﾠas	 ﾠunfortunate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYet	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠour	 ﾠattitude.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠhold	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Strawson	 ﾠamong	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccept.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“no	 ﾠless	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠ…	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠelse’s).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠflows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoneself,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutlook,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
mentally”	 ﾠ(2003,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ247	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠflows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠan	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠimply	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpraised	 ﾠand	 ﾠblamed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠflows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
mentally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠrouse	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpraised	 ﾠor	 ﾠblamed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outputs	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠour	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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cognitively	 ﾠaccountable,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠthey	 ﾠaccept.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthis	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠas	 ﾠrevelatory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoodness	 ﾠor	 ﾠbadness	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠask	 ﾠher	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsuch-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐such	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
satisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer:	 ﾠ“Well,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtook	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠA,	 ﾠB,	 ﾠand	 ﾠC,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresult”).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠher	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠare	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠpoor,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠshe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠshe	 ﾠholds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠask	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠdidn’t	 ﾠyou	 ﾠtake	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcare?”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ“How	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
you	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠare,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠact:	 ﾠrecognizing	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagency	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaccountable,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
deliberative	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnudging	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠproceeds,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
deliberation	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠoneself,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphenomena.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠone	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠone	 ﾠholds	 ﾠremains	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠplus	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠ“ineffable”	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠone	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
again,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠjust	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
cognitively	 ﾠaccountable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbicycle:	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠleft	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
location,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠgets	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠarrived	 ﾠat	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠin.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠno	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠantecedents	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠI	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠcogency,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠin	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
discretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinstallation	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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and	 ﾠremoval,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself.22	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
V.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ But	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠhave	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠacts?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Believing	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠor	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠascribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠtense:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ“S	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠ
P,”	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“S	 ﾠis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason:	 ﾠin	 ﾠascribing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimply	 ﾠanything	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠup	 ﾠto:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
thoughts,	 ﾠor	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ(voluntary)	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠdreamless	 ﾠ
sleep,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠretain	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfortunate	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
utterly	 ﾠdisoriented	 ﾠeach	 ﾠmorning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠascribe	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠseems	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
imply	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdispositions,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠif	 ﾠ—,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠdoing.23	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠact?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
occurrently	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
species	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus:	 ﾠact,	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP”	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdoing?”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhere	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠtense,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠbelieve”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
stative	 ﾠverb	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠascribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠtense.24	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠRelated	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠPamela	 ﾠHieronymi’s	 ﾠ“Responsibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠMental	 ﾠAgency”	 ﾠ(unpublished	 ﾠms.),	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“answerability”	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ“accountability”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
designate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
praised	 ﾠor	 ﾠblamed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcondition’s	 ﾠ
obtaining	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠstandpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠis	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠSearle:	 ﾠ
Acts	 ﾠare	 ﾠthings	 ﾠone	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠ‘What	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠnow	 ﾠdoing?’	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠgoes,	 ﾠ‘I	 ﾠam	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrain’…	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Searle	 ﾠ1983,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠdo”	 ﾠappears	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmain	 ﾠverb	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠan	 ﾠauxiliary	 ﾠverb,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“Do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsaid?”),	 ﾠonly	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐stative	 ﾠverbs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
“to	 ﾠdo”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠverb	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠaspectual	 ﾠmodifiers	 ﾠ(is	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing,	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ed),	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠstative	 ﾠverbs	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠaspectual	 ﾠmodification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠof	 ﾠstative	 ﾠverbs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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belief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠanything	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact,	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
argue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠanalogy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠI	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§II	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“certain	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ‘why?’”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠG.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ(Anscombe	 ﾠ1963).	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠremarked	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠPamela	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Anscombe	 ﾠ…	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠone	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠø’s	 ﾠ…	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠasked,	 ﾠ‘Why	 ﾠdid	 ﾠyou	 ﾠø?”	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ‘Why	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠø-ﾭ‐ing?’)	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
looks,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠø-ﾭ‐ed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠø-ﾭ‐ing…	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠby	 ﾠbelief:	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ…	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
asked,	 ﾠ‘Why	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP?’	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠlooks,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
explanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
considerations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Hieronymi	 ﾠ
2007,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ359)25	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠhere	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠthan	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠsuggests.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasked	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustifying	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
actions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠpresupposes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactuality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠaction).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Something	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠin	 ﾠAnscombe	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsets	 ﾠher	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠaction	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠher	 ﾠresolute	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogress.26	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Anscombe’s	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠis	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠand	 ﾠforemost	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠA?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Hieronymi’s	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠactiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthey	 ﾠascribe,	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
mediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgrammatical	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ127.	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠI	 ﾠowe	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnscombe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠother	 ﾠideas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollow,	 ﾠto	 ﾠconversations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDoug	 ﾠ
Lavin.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
shift	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠdid	 ﾠyou	 ﾠø?”	 ﾠobscures	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠapproach.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Her	 ﾠassumption,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
describe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠunfolds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠis	 ﾠput	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠby	 ﾠHarry	 ﾠFrankfurt,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
maintains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠdifferentiating	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction”	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠis	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠan	 ﾠaction	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠtouch	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbody	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠtouch	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠway	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
body	 ﾠare	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Frankfurt	 ﾠ1978,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ158)	 ﾠ
Frankfurt	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“being	 ﾠin	 ﾠtouch”	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
agent	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠset	 ﾠhis	 ﾠaction	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ“guides”	 ﾠits	 ﾠprogress.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
theories	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemarcate	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbodily	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠactions	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
appeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠantecedent	 ﾠcauses,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠviews	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“actions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
mere	 ﾠhappenings	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,”	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“actions	 ﾠand	 ﾠmere	 ﾠ
happenings	 ﾠ[are]	 ﾠdifferentiated	 ﾠ[only]	 ﾠby	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠquite	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem”	 ﾠ(Ibid.,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
157).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠview,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠan	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠguided	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
unfolding	 ﾠis	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠhappens.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠAnscombe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠview.27	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
Frankfurt	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠguidance,	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠ
investigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
specification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ“why?”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠknows	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐observation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠhim	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠinquires	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
sees	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ(cp.	 ﾠAnscombe	 ﾠ
1963,	 ﾠ§16).	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠher	 ﾠdark	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“‘intentional’	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents”	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“displayed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠenquiries	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠ‘Why?’”	 ﾠ(Anscombe	 ﾠ1963,	 ﾠ§47,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ84).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmean:	 ﾠan	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠcauses,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐question.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠto	 ﾠAnscombe,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠor	 ﾠspeculative	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠ–	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so	 ﾠanyway,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠso	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
she	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠ“practical	 ﾠknowledge”,	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠcause	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠunderstands”	 ﾠ
(Ibid.,	 ﾠ§48,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ87).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠmean:	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ
intentionally,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠon	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠX,	 ﾠY,	 ﾠZ	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠX,	 ﾠY,	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠ
precipitating	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠevents	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠany	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠmy	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠunfolds,	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
concept:	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing,	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠof	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
intuitive	 ﾠappeal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠactions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠabout	 ﾠour	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠto	 ﾠnotice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
striking	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
hold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases	 ﾠconcern,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠour	 ﾠpast	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠor	 ﾠour	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠprospects	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠour	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠus	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠmedias	 ﾠres,”	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
speak:	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmidst	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠor	 ﾠbelieving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠable,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐observation,	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhat?-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhy?-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠabout	 ﾠan	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠour	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠA	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠX,	 ﾠY,	 ﾠZ,	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠfor	 ﾠno	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠreason)	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠ
(on	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠX,	 ﾠY,	 ﾠZ,	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgrounds)	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.28	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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28	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐believed,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
hold	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent:	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbelieved.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠrather	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP	 ﾠitself:	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
sound	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmeet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠequip	 ﾠher,	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠto	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbelieved,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠher	 ﾠstance	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
acceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalready	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠwarranted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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certain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcausally,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠconstitutively	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“situations.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogress,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠstasis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠblind	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠanalogy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject’s	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
actuality,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrux	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠgenerically	 ﾠunderstood:	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠof	 ﾠX-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠX-ﾭ‐ing,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
possess	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠX-ﾭ‐
ing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠX-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠis	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact.29	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠA	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
actualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠas	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐done,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthus	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐believed,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
actualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠas	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐believed,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠI	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠan	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠan	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠstate)	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠpersistently	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠas	 ﾠacceptable:	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
capacity,	 ﾠI	 ﾠshould	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent:	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
actuality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠendorsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactuality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠme	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
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29	 ﾠThis	 ﾠformula	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠI	 ﾠframe	 ﾠusing	 ﾠgerunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐occurrent	 ﾠsubstituends)	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠan	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠclarification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
said	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠendorsement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠhope	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
plausible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠidea	 ﾠhere	 ﾠworth	 ﾠinvestigating.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠshould	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠformula	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
agency,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency-ﾭ‐full-ﾭ‐stop.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRational	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠcognizant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone,	 ﾠquite	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠ
species	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency:	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠagents	 ﾠare	 ﾠjudgers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
founded	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐maintenance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠcognizant,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠother	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠBoyle	 ﾠand	 ﾠLavin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuggestive	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠin	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠGurpreet	 ﾠRattan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠformulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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those	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhold	 ﾠof	 ﾠme,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠevents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
endorse	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠmy	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
situation,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
way.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠinvite	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠit	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
intentionally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactions	 ﾠis	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠmy	 ﾠacts:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠextrinsically	 ﾠbut	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠunder	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontrol.30	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠby	 ﾠFrankfurt’s	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“guidance”	 ﾠand	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠby	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐
question	 ﾠ–	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠset	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠunfolds	 ﾠunder	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsteam,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
part.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠin	 ﾠguiding	 ﾠour	 ﾠactions	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠrather	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠactive	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
done.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠI	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠit	 ﾠextrinsically,	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠits	 ﾠunfolding.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderway	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
insofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠpersistently	 ﾠdirecting	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠcompletion:	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠdone	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠintrinsically:	 ﾠits	 ﾠvery	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
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30	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠevident,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions	 ﾠonly	 ﾠextrinsically,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthese	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠacts	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠarise:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠdo	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthese	 ﾠacts?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthem	 ﾠis	 ﾠonce	 ﾠagain	 ﾠextrinsic,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠposit	 ﾠyet	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠof	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠregress.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthem	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
intrinsic	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
presumably	 ﾠjust	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsuggestive	 ﾠremark	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠFrankfurt:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠa	 ﾠdriver	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠautomobile.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Otherwise	 ﾠaction	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived,	 ﾠupon	 ﾠpain	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠan	 ﾠinfinite	 ﾠregress,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠunder	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent's	 ﾠguidance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠacting	 ﾠare	 ﾠpurposive	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
characteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Frankfurt	 ﾠ1978,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ160)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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persistent	 ﾠactive	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠif	 ﾠour	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠour	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
expect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠintrinsic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
foregoing	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠsheds	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠstands	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠaffirmative	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHer	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠassent	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠto	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠtruth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠassent	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprecedes	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠit;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
her	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠby	 ﾠher	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠassent	 ﾠto	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHer	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
say,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠis	 ﾠher	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠholding	 ﾠP	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐believed.31	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
occurrent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠany	 ﾠbustle	 ﾠor	 ﾠcommotion,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠ
consciousness	 ﾠor	 ﾠelsewhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠview,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠevery	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠbustle	 ﾠor	 ﾠcommotion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagency	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠendorsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠ(pursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠaim,	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠtrue),	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠactuality	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠA,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠto	 ﾠactuality	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStill	 ﾠher	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
persistently	 ﾠaffirmative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠstill	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreadiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠobjections,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠand	 ﾠher	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
forefront	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠattention	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠshe	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠactually,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠreflect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHer	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠenduring,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐occurrent	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠassenting	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
venerable	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠphilosophy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacts	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠhampered	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠon	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠwho	 ﾠsubscribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fully	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ“‘Making	 ﾠup	 ﾠYour	 ﾠMind’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠActivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠReason”	 ﾠ(unpublished	 ﾠms).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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enduring	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠassent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdeems	 ﾠreasonable.32	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Her	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠintrinsic.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠrational	 ﾠaction:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠstands	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
species	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠrational	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠroughly,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
realized	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠrealization	 ﾠis	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠor	 ﾠintended.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠagents	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠneither	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠnor	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠresult:	 ﾠit	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
widespread	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
voluntary	 ﾠrational	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠunprecedented.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠits	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠin	 ﾠKant,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠheld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“spontaneity,”	 ﾠits	 ﾠpower	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐consciously	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠitself	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠaffection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠKant	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdeployments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
spontaneous	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠproduce,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠdeployment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠoperative	 ﾠin	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobject	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠrepresents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠdeployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“autonomy,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“spontaneity”	 ﾠitself	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠexemplified	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠobjects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠarrived,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmundane	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
thought.33	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠAnscombe	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
intentional	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCommenting	 ﾠon	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠ
action,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠmental	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠabsurd.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠan	 ﾠorder	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdone	 ﾠwith	 ﾠintentions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Anscombe	 ﾠ1963,	 ﾠ§42,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ80)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠon	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠDoug	 ﾠLavin	 ﾠand	 ﾠDick	 ﾠMoran,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠon	 ﾠBelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠAgency	 ﾠheld	 ﾠat	 ﾠRyerson	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠToronto,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
23-ﾭ‐24,	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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